I'm doing a paper on the incompetence theory.
“It has been said that the intelligence agencies have to be right 100% of the time. And the terrorists only have to get lucky once. This explanation for the devastating attacks of September 11th, simple on its face, is wrong in its value, because the 9-11 terrorists were not just lucky once. They were lucky over and over again. When you have this repeated pattern of broken protocols, broken laws, broken communication, one cannot still call it luck. If at some point, we don’t look to hold the individuals accountable for not doing their jobs, properly, then how can we ever expect for terrorists to not get lucky again?â€
“I can’t think of a single person being held accountable anywhere in government for what went on and what went wrong prior to Sept. 11, it seems that nobody in government makes any mistakes anymore.â€
"instead of accountability, several of the key figures—[Generals] Myers and Eberhard, FAA official Ben Sliney—have been promoted since Sept. 11! …one or more of them must be wrong about what happened on 9/11,†noted Nicholas Levis.
“generally it is impossible to carry out an act of terror on the scenario which was used in the USA yesterday… As soon as something like that happens here, I am reported about that right away and in a minute we are all up.â€
“The task that the FAA allegedly failed to perform repeatedly that day—notifying the military when an airplane shows any of the standard signs of being in trouble—is one that the FAA had long been carrying out regularly, over 100 times a year. Can we really believe that virtually everyone—from the flight controllers to their managers to the personnel in Herndon and FAA headquarters—suddenly became ridiculously incompetent to perform this task? This allegation becomes even more unbelievable when we reflect on the fact that the FAA successfully carried out an unprecedented operation that day: grounding all the aircraft in the country. The Commission itself says that the FAA ‘[executed] that unprecedented order flawlessly.’ Is it plausible that FAA personnel, on the same day that they carried out an unprecedented task so flawlessly, would have failed so miserably with a task that they, decade after decade, had been performing routinely?â€
“Consider that an aircraft emergency exists ... when: ...There is unexpected loss of radar contact and radio communications with any ...aircraft.†—FAA Order 7110.65M 10-2-5 (6)
“If ... you are in doubt that a situation constitutes an emergency or potential emergency, handle it as though it were an emergency.†—FAA Order 7110.65M 10-1-1-c (7)
“I know people who work there who confirmed to me that the FAA was not asleep and the controllers could do the job, they followed their own protocols… [The] Pentagon on American 11 didn't answer the phone, neither 175, didn't answer the phone and they didn't answer the phone until they were absolutely embarrassed into answering the phone somewhere along the flight of United 93 and American 77."
“Air traffic controllers who handled two of the hijacked flights on September 11, 2001, recorded their experiences shortly after the planes crashed, but a supervisor destroyed the tape,†and that “an F.A.A. quality-assurance manager… crushed the cassette in his hand, cut the tape into little pieces and dropped them in different trash cans around the building.â€
“suspicion of [Pentagon] wrongdoing ran so deep that the 10-member commission, in a secret meeting at the end of its tenure in summer 2004, debated referring the matter to the Justice Department for criminal investigation.â€
Dayton Claimed that NORAD officials “lied to the American people, they lied to Congress and they lied to your 9/11 commission to create a false impression of competence, communication and protection of the American people.â€
“Ample evidence gathered from mainstream news sources and compiled by Paul Thompson… indicates that the wargames served to confuse and stymie air defense response to the simultaneous crash-bombings. Although Thompson avoids conclusions and merely presents a long series of verifiable facts, confusion appears to have been the exact result intended by at least some of the wargame planners. This was already a central thesis of Mike Rupperts's 2004 book Crossing the Rubicon.â€